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authorized by the Affordable 
Care Act (ACA). Under this poli-
cy, ACOs could participate in 
one of two types of 3-year ar-
rangements. In the first path, in 
years 1 and 2 they would be eli-
gible to share any savings they 
achieved relative to a spending 
target without accepting “down-
side” risk. In year 3, the ACOs 
would be required to repay 
Medicare for a percentage of any 
spending over their target level. 
In the second path, an ACO 
could accept downside risk be-
ginning in year 1 and thereby be 
eligible for a higher proportion 
of any savings (60% vs. 50%). All 
shared-savings payments would 
be contingent on meeting estab-
lished quality goals and mini-
mum savings thresholds (3.9% 
for the one-sided risk model and 
2% for the two-sided risk mod-
el). Shared-savings payments to 
the ACO could not exceed 7.5% 
of the total target costs; pay-
ments by the ACO to Medicare 
would not exceed 5% of those 
costs in the first year it accepted 
downside risk (then 7.5% in year 
2 and 10% in year 3.)
Since the proposed policy 
was issued, there has been a 
f lurry of analysis and criticism, 
much of which concerns wheth-
er the new payment terms offer 
sufficient financial rewards to 
attract provider participation. 
But the regulation is better as-
sessed as a solution to a con-
tracting problem, which requires 
that it accomplish two goals: 
saving money for Medicare 
without causing substantial ad-
verse consequences, and encour-
aging enough groups to partici-
pate. We believe there are ways 
for CMS to improve participa-
tion in ACOs without sacrificing 
the workhorse provisions of the 
new policy.
The proposed regulations rely 
on limited risk sharing and the 
imposition of quality standards 
in order to attain a balance 
among incentives for cost con-
trol, risk, and maintenance of 
high-value service delivery. Un-
like full capitation, the ACO ar-
rangements limit risk in two 
ways. First, ACO profits are af-
fected only by changes in Medi-
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care spending within a “risk 
corridor” (see diagram) that 
caps both gains and losses. For 
example, in the third year in 
which an ACO accepts two-sided 
risk, its obligations to repay CMS 
cease accruing once spending 
has reached 116.7% of the tar-
get (since ACO losses are capped 
at 10% of the target and losses 
borne by the ACO are 60% of 
the total, losses peak at over-
runs of 16.7% × 60% = 10%). Sec-
ond, Medicare and the ACO 
share in every dollar of gain or 
loss, which means that an extra 
dollar of spending within the 
risk corridor reduces profits to 
the ACO by only 60 cents.
The proposed payment ar-
rangement also differs from 
that used in Medicare’s Physi-
cian Group Practice (PGP) dem-
onstration, in which providers 
were eligible for shared savings 
but took on no downside risk. 
Introducing this risk has two 
advantages: it addresses the crit-
icism that a shared-savings ap-
proach alone is too weak to 
force fundamental change in the 
care delivery model1; and it in-
creases the range of costs over 
which an ACO’s profits vary 
with costs, providing greater in-
centives to manage utilization.
A two-sided risk-sharing 
model is not without potential 
pitfalls, however. Some have ex-
pressed concern that downside 
risk could bring a return of the 
worst consequences of the man-
aged-care era, including patient 
backlash and provider insolven-
cy.2 Another prominent worry 
about more intensive risk shar-
ing is that providers will seek to 
avoid high-cost patients. Al-
though such possibilities cannot 
be eliminated, quality measure-
ment with pay for performance, 
lack of patient lock-in, and caps 
on gains and losses should miti-
gate these unintended conse-
quences.
Critics in both the provider 
and the policy communities have 
expressed concern that few orga-
nizations will sign up as ACOs, 
given the payment structure. 
This participation question goes 
beyond the desire to attain a 
critical mass of ACOs: Medicare 
seeks to improve the delivery of 
care by a broad range of provid-
ers, not just those that already 
manage care efficiently. It there-
fore needs providers that have 
room for improvement to take 
a chance on the new payment 
model.
Given the unfavorable reac-
tion of many provider organiza-
tions, some additional steps to 
ensure participation are war-
ranted. Indeed, CMS has already 
made clear that the two pro-
posed paths are not the only 
bases on which providers can 
become ACOs. Alternative op-
tions will be available to at least 
some applicants through pilots 
initiated by the Center for Medi-
care and Medicaid Innovation. 
For example, providers that 
meet high standards for infra-
structure and experience with 
population-based payment can 
apply to become Pioneer ACOs 
and take on greater risk with a 
lower threshold before shared 
savings kick in (1%). But it may 
be worthwhile for CMS to do 
more to tip the balance for the 
ACO program that is open to all.
We see preserving the two-
sided risk model in the final 
regulations as a priority because 
it creates the kind of high-pow-
ered incentives to control costs 
that are urgently needed. More-
over, many ACO-like entities ac-
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Consequences of Risk Sharing for ACOs That Accept Two-Sided Risk.
The solid blue line indicates the level of shared-savings payments to an ACO (where the line is 
above the x axis) or obligations to repay Medicare (where the line is below the x axis) as a function 
of Medicare spending for the population of patients attributed to the ACO. Shared savings are 
capped at 7.5% of the target, and the ACO receives 60% of any savings above the minimum savings 
threshold, which is 2% of the target spending level. When Medicare spending exceeds the target, 
the ACO is obligated to pay 60% of the excess with a similar 2% threshold for payment. Payments 
to Medicare for excess spending in the ACO are capped at 5% in the first year, and the cap increas-
es by 2.5 percentage points in each of the subsequent 2 years.
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cept two-sided risk contracts al-
ready. But CMS could do more 
to increase the upside for ACO 
participants to ensure broad-
based participation.
First, the agency could offer a 
complement of early-adopter fi-
nancial incentives (such as more 
generous shares of savings in 
the first 3 years of the program 
and loans to finance start-up 
costs) to front-load more of the 
benefits. Lowering or eliminat-
ing the requirement for achiev-
ing minimum savings before 
ACOs can reap a share of the 
gains (i.e., the 2-to-3.9% savings 
required before shared savings 
begin) would also increase the 
benefits of participation. In a 
situation of two-sided risk, in 
particular, the rationale for such 
required minimum savings is 
not as clear.
Alternatively, there may be 
barriers to participation that 
CMS could lower without com-
mitting substantial additional 
resources. Under the draft regu-
lations, providers would be obli-
gated to meet a number of po-
tentially costly documentation 
and data-collection requirements 
to become an ACO. For exam-
ple, some provider groups have 
voiced concerns about the large 
numbers of quality measures 
(more than 60) that ACOs will be 
required to track and report on 
in the first 3 years. CMS could 
meet providers at least partway 
on another key issue that pro-
viders have highlighted: the lack 
of prospective assignment to an 
ACO of the beneficiaries whose 
costs will be counted in any 
shared-savings calculation. Pro-
spective identification of enroll-
ees that belong to an ACO would 
make it possible for providers to 
conduct outreach and more effec-
tively manage population health. 
CMS might allow beneficiaries 
that prospectively enroll in an 
ACO to share in the savings that 
the ACO realizes, perhaps through 
a lower Part B premium.
The vision underlying the ACO 
movement — of provider account-
ability that goes beyond delivering 
an individual service and of care 
that is integrated and patient-
focused — is one worth pursu-
ing with bold steps. CMS has 
many good ideas in its ACO pro-
posal. We believe that the final 
risk-sharing methods should build 
off this model — retaining the 
possibility of losses as well as 
savings — but front-load the 
benefits more and provide the 
tools and flexibility that provid-
er groups will need to rational-
ize the delivery of medical care. 
Of course, the regulations are just 
the beginning of bringing ACOs 
to Medicare. CMS will have to 
develop capabilities to work in 
new ways with providers, shar-
ing data and information in a 
timely manner, supporting change 
with technical assistance, and 
monitoring patient care for po-
tential adverse consequences.
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